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The policy aim expressed at the Lisbon1 summit (March 2000)– and reiterated at the recent 
spring Barcelona summit (March 2002) – to develop the European Union into the most 
efficient knowledge-based economy in the world, and hence raise substantially the amount of 
R&D and innovation expenditures in the European Research Area (ERA), is undoubtedly 
from a policy commitment perspective, a useful target, raising the awareness with national 
policy makers and the public at large of the importance of research, development and 
innovation for European long term sustainable growth, employment and welfare. 
Unfortunately, contrary to other, more directly policy related, macro-economic targets such as 
the EMU criteria of monetary unification in the nineties, the targeting of quantitative 
measures in the area of innovation, research and development is, to put it simply, more easily 
said than done. It has, as a matter of fact, been tried many times before in individual EU 
member countries (one may think of Harold Wilson White Heat policy campaign in the late 
60’s in the UK). The attempt to set out such policy targets within the context of the 
development of a European Research Area raises even more fundamental challenges. As the 
analysis of the Commission quite correctly emphasized, there is as yet no European national 
system of innovation. Europe seems rather characterized by a variety of different national 
innovation systems. Those systems each have their pecularities, as was illustrated in the 
empirical analysis in Chapter 2 of this report. To “mobilise” and connect these, eventually 
integrate them raises many structural challenges to the supply side of Europe’s national RTD 
systems.  
 
Yet as was highlighted in this report, if anything it is the supply side of the national systems 
of innovation which European countries appear to have relatively well under control. As 
expected, poorer member countries spend relatively less on higher education and research 
than richer member countries. As growth convergence between the different EU member 
countries continues and is further enhanced by economic and monetary integration, it can be 
expected that poorer countries will slowly catch up to the richer member countries higher 
levels of public and private investment in higher education and research. This process takes 
time. It can and has been enhanced by private capital transfers to poorer member countries 
under the form of foreign direct investment, and transfers of public funds through the 
European Structural Funds. The ERA will hopefully accelerate this trend and not induce the 
opposite with a further strengthening of the concentration of research activities in the existing, 
predominantly richer countries, core knowledge growth poles.  
 
The balance between policies focusing on research and higher education excellence and 
policies focusing on the spreading and diffusion of knowledge – what we have tried to 
summarise here under the concept of “absorptive” capacity – is hence a priority issue of 
policy concern. It is a policy trade off which one finds reflected in the RTD policies of many 
member countries. It is also an area, which brings to the forefront the multitude of alternative 
institutional set-ups of RTD policies. Countries with a clear federal structure both outside of 
the EU, such as Canada, the US or Switzerland, as well within the EU such as Belgium, 
Germany or Spain provide interesting illustrations about the efficacy and institutional 
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development of regional2 based RTD policies, alternatively countries with a long tradition of 
regional clustering and networking of knowledge activities such as Italy point to the particular 
contribution of regional players in raising the “absorptive capacity” of particular local 
communities. Spatial proximity matters in other words, regions appear from this perspective, 
key players in global competitiveness. It is to this subject that we turn first. 
 
4.1 RTD policies, competitiveness and employment: a new role for regional policies 
 
Within the framework of further European integration, the international presence of most 
large multinational firms carrying out the bulk of European and world-wide, private RTD 
investments and innovation efforts, and the increasing international access to codified 
knowledge, the relationship between “national” RTD policies and “national” competitiveness 
becomes increasingly less relevant as policy aim. Competitiveness is in this sense something 
of the past, something “nationalistic” at odds with the increasing global markets on which 
RTD and innovation intensive firms are forced to operate today. While the notion might retain 
some value in positioning a country’s relative cost efficiency e.g. in terms of unit labour costs, 
based on country wide wage negotiations, its real value will increasingly be at the regional 
level. Indeed, it is at the level of regions that designing appropriate RTD policies for 
competitiveness and employment provides the largest scope for policy learning and 
benchmarking. But before describing some of those, it might be useful to point to an 
additional justification from the European perspective.  
  
Economic and social cohesion – usually defined in terms of equity considerations such as 
regional disparities or social inclusion – is a fundamental aim of the EU articulated in Article 
2 of the Treaty. However, empirical research has shown that regional disparities in economic 
performance remain substantial, and have even increased within many member countries over 
the last decade3. This gap is especially marked as regards innovative activity. What appears is 
that there exists a subgroup of high R&D, high income regions in Europe with its own internal 
dynamics. What distinguishes these high R&D regions from the rest is mainly that RTD and 
innovation matter a lot in the former, while they are of little importance in the latter. There is 
thus, at least if the last decades are something to go by, a clear risk that a faster rate of 
innovation, vital for European growth and competitiveness in general, might further aggravate 
regional disparities.  
 
Although data are scarce on many factors of potential relevance for regional growth (see also 
the case of Italian districts described in Chapter 3 and the Appendix), the evidence clearly 
indicates that most low-income regions have failed to exploit the potential for technology 
diffusion. It points to a need for policies aimed at enhancing the capacity of such regions to 
absorb new technologies, and indicators able to reflect the progress of such policies. The low 
rate of diffusion in those regions is often associated with a structure of activity dominated by 
agriculture or ‘older’ industries, and a corresponding lack of high- tech activities, often 
combined with relatively high unemployment.  
                                                 
2 regional here means subnational level 
3 See amongst others European Commission (2001) The Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion; Fagerberg, J. and 
B. Verspagen (1996), ‘Heading for Divergence? Regional Growth in Europe Reconsidered’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 34, 431–48; Fagerberg, J., B. Verspagen and M. Caniëls (1997) «Technology, Growth and Unemployment across 
European Regions», Regional Studies, 31, 457-466. Also the Commission’s Communication on the “Regional Dimension of 




There is hence a clear need for RTD policies with a regional dimension and focus. Policies, 
which provide a much stronger mix of structural change and RTD. The regional aspects of the 
local system of innovation are in other words essential. It is, in the expert group’s view, at this 
level that the analysis as illustrated in Figure 2.5 and 3.5 should ideallly be carried out. In 
some regions this might well imply a strong policy focus on local “attractors” strongly 
embedded in the local research capacity, in other countries on diffusion. The trade-off in 
regional RTD policies can be found in practically all European regions. Success and/or failure 
will strongly depend on local (and geographical) context conditions, the timing of the policy 
and the success in achieving regional “clustering” of economic activities. As the various cases 
analysed in Chapter 3 illustrate policies will often involve a mixture between specific and 
generic policies.  
 
The most effective road to achieve the Lisbon and Barcelona targets is from this perspective 
the regional policy road. It is a policy road, which runs parallel with the one that focuses on 
regional differences in Europe. Here it is not enough to increase investment in education and 
research in some of the lower income regions in Europe. In these regions as well as in the new 
candidate countries there is a much stronger need to strengthen the absorptive capacity of the 
private sector. Subsidising hiring highly educated personel, supporting the establishment of 
private and public bridging organizations and giving access to risk capital need to be 
combined in order to valorize investments in the knowledge base (the same type of measures 
needed in most of the poor regions outside Europe).  
 
Such measures are especially necessary when ‘excellent institutions’ in low-income areas are 
linked up on wider networks dominated by high income metropoles. Otherwise there is a risk 
for increased ‘brain-drain’ where local knowledge is used mainly outside its home region. 
Knowledge production is highly centrifugal and if left to itself the stronger emphasis on 
knowledge based production risks to increase regional income differences. 
 
We recommend that the benchmarking exercise on the impact of RTD policies on 
competitiveness and employment is expanded in the direction of regional policy 
initiatives. Competitiveness and sustainable employment are policy aims, which in an 
increasingly integrated Europe are first and foremost notions, which obtain their true 
value within a regional context. Furthermore the creation of a European Research 
Area renders the need for such a regional benchmarking focus more relevant than 
ever, if one is to counter some of the unwarranted negative concentration effects of 
RTD in the richer, most knowledge intensive regions of the EU.  
 
4.2 RTD and innovation policies: in search of incentives and complementarities 
  
It is of course the private sector of the economy, which has become the target certainly since 
Barcelona to raise its innovation performance most dramatically over the next five to ten 
years. In order to induce European businesses to increase their innovation efforts, they will 
need to be given a number of incentives. Policies as we saw in Chapter 3 can either focus 
directly on such incentives or on some of the essential complementarities. The list of 
incentives is to some extent rather well known: protection of intellectual property rights, the 
granting of temporary monopoly power, direct and indirect innovation support measures, the 
permission to cooperate and the rewards given to scientific achievements. They have all been 
introduced in various ways in the European Union member countries: some as we saw in 
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Chapter 3 can be described as cases of truly “best practice” but others inspired by very similar 
policy objectives, appear in a different policy framework examples of weak practice. 
 
RTD policies are generally uneasily embedded in a number of typical micro-economic policy 
trade offs: stimulation of creation versus support for diffusion: subsidies to small and medium 
sized firms as opposed to large, often multi-national firms; and last but not least allowance, 
even encouragement of research and development collaboration between firms sometimes in 
cooperation with public research agencies (universities, public laboratories). Each one of 
these trade-offs is typically assessed differently over time. Today, with most large 
multinational firms having reduced significantly their long term, more fundamental research 
activities, the focus of most national and regional RTD policies have shifted towards the 
active support to networking and collaboration in research, technology and innovation, both 
within the research and within the industry sectors, and across the two. One may think of 
support to research consortia, the creation of centres of excellence, creating critical masses of 
research activities in specific areas. Similarly networking within business for innovation has 
been encouraged through cluster policies, while joint business R&D activities have also been 
the subject of policy support, not the least from the European level. Finally, the promotion of 
industry-science relationships has focused on the creation of intermediaries, of bridging and 
collaborative programmes, etc. Not surprisingly such policies have increasingly come into 
conflict with the two other trade-offs: competition policy and the implicit size bias in the 
support programmes. As a result incentive policies for business supporting the creation of 
new-technology-based firms has been developed: various types of subsidies, soft schemes, 
transfer programmes, venture capital funds, academic entrepreneurship promotion 
programmes, changes in IPR rules, etc. have been set up with public intervention, in order to 
create a better environment for new firm creation, notably for those founded on the 
exploitation of research results. This latter set of policies has led policy makers to become 
more aware of the specific deficiencies experienced by SMEs in their innovation trajectories. 
Because of their limited size, these companies often lack the critical mass to support all the 
necessary functions needed to innovate. Many “SME-specific” programmes have thus been 
set up at all levels (regional, national, European) whereby the definition of size is as 
diversified as are the programmes, but all aiming at addressing these barriers, and developing 
more favourable access conditions for companies under a certain size in more general support 
programmes. While each of these programmes has its own micro-economic justification, it is 
clear that many different sometimes contradictory policy aims lay behind their introduction 
and justification.   
  
We hence remain hesitant to rank particular RTD policies on a best practice scale independent 
of the particular context within which these policies were designed, implemented and carried 
out. If benchmarking is primarily inspired by a desire to get quick and easy access to 
information on which to base action; to avoid to open up the black box, to get some meters to 
read and some handles to turn, it might possibly work if the “operator” is experienced and 
skilful, but not if he is a standard administrator with little insight in the specific policy field. 
Some phenomena are more easy to register and some handles more easy to turn than others. 
To restrict policy to easily registered success (e.g. the growth in indicators easily measured) 
and easily turned handles is of course a great temptation and may sometimes even be the only 
possible line of action. This gives priority to amounts of resources and flows rather than to 
qualitative characteristics and relationships. To register an increase in the amount of public 
investment in knowledge production is easier than to register a strengthening of linkages or an 
increase in quality. To pursue policies in areas where conflicts are not evoked is more easy 
than to pursue policies that attack privileges in private or public sector. Furthermore, for 
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historical reasons the attention is much stronger to certain phenomena than others. R&D has 
been measured and benchmarked for many years while the diffusion of organizational and 
management techniques have been neglected in the public policy sphere. In the 
recommendations under this heading we have tried to emphasize what tends to be neglected 
because it is difficult to measure or because it takes one into areas of conflict. 
 
In benchmarking and assessing RTD policies care must be taken of the often 
contradictory policy trade offs which lay behind the original justification for the 
design and implementation of such policies. Those trade-offs change over time: the 
stimulation of the creation versus the support for diffusion; the support for small 
versus large firms; the stimulation of collaboration between private and public 
research are all policies which might at some time be justified, at other less. It is 
therefore essential to evaluate carefully at each moment in time the particular 
complementary needs. As a consequence, the expert group remains reluctant to rank 
particular RTD policies on a best practice scale independent of the particular context 
within which these policies were designed, implemented and carried out.  
 
 
4.3 RTD in “public” areas: in search of private and public incentives 
  
But it would be a mistake to focus all the attent ion to policy measures directed towards the 
competitiveness of Europe’s business community. The aim of RTD policies is not just to 
contribute to the efficient and internationally competitive and sustainable production of high 
quality products and services but also to contribute to the creation of high quality work places, 
to education and learning, to improve the health and living conditions of citizens, to realize 
global sustainability, to support the reproduction and renewal of cultural life in a democratic 
society.  
 
Nearly as a corollary of the previous set of arguments policies should focus here on 
developing new, or expanding existing incentive schemes to raise RTD and innovation 
investment and knowledge diffusion in areas with a high social rate of return. Investment may 
come through private or public sources. Private firms, foundations as well as individuals 
typically invest much more in the US in such research activities (health, education, culture, 
environment) than in Europe where these fields are to some extent the responsability of the 
public sector. Such public funding efforts are of course a reflection of deliberate political 
choices. Thus, Europe’s heavy public investments in health, social and welfare programmes 
are also a reflection of Europe’s social and welfare achievements. The fact that on average the 
European citizen spends less on health and medical expenses (both of a public and private 
nature) as a percentage of GDP than the average US citizen illustrates from this perspective 
the relative success of Europe’s social model. A similar statement with respect to higher 
education does, however, sound far less convincing. The public right to cheap higher 
education in many European countries, is very much likely to have reduced the private 
incentive for citizens and firms to invest in their own higher and technical education. The 
fundamental trade-off, one is confronted with is the notion that public investments in RTD 
areas with a high social rate of return are considered on the one hand political 
“achievements”, reflections of the quality of life of the citizens, and on the other hand viewed 
as missed RTD investment opportunities: areas of high income growth areas in which citizens 
would actually like to invest but have no incentive to do so.  
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The expert group hence emphasizes the need to design incentive schemes for increased 
investment in RTD areas with a high social rate of return (education, health, environmental 
goals, culture). In some countries this might point to schemes specifically designed for the 
private sector, in other countries to individual citizens, to public/private partnerships or to the 
public sector itself.  
 
People in Europe need to allocate more of their income and time to activities that enhance 
their competence and the same is true for firms and for government. In addition to the general 
arguments put forward above one may add the following: the growing complexity and 
speeding up of change which tends to devalue old competence more rapidly than before; the 
demand for knowledge stemming from citizens’ need to understand what is going on in terms 
of cultural and societal change; the need for critical assessment and evaluation of the working 
of the institutions involved in the production and distribution of knowledge in order to 
enhance the social rate of return on the investments. The division of labour among 
universities, schools, civil society and private firms in knowledge production and distribution 
needs to be revised in many respects in order to adjust them to the new context. 
 
There is a need to fully recognize the importance of the role of knowledge in socio-
economic life in general, to understand how this role works and affects all aspects of 
life, not just competitiveness or work.  Viewed in this way the national innovation 
system must relate to relevant knowledge in all its forms. Science and technology are 
vital parts of the innovation process and scientific and technological innovation is a 
vital element of  industrial innovation.  However, there are other dimensions as well. 
In an enterprise context, organisational, managerial, distribution, marketing and 
logistical innovations can be equally important. In a societal context, social, 
individual responsibility and expression of interest, participatory and communication 
innovations are equally important. Both contribute ultimately to long term growth and 
welfare and sustainable employment. 
 
4.4 On the need for RTD policy “creative destruction”: towards a simple set of rules 
 
Following from the conceptual and empirical analysis carried out above, it appears legitimate 
to ask whether current policy thinking is sufficiently radical.  Many of the constituent parts of 
the European public innovation system, both in terms of overall institutions and individual 
programs and schemes, have a long, some would say “rich” policy history going back to the 
1970s and 80s, if not earlier. While adjustments in overall institutional configurations have 
taken place, the essential operational features of the schemes have remained broadly similar.  
Present policy analysis, with the partial exception of the most radical interpretation of the 
“European research area” tends to take these structures as largely a given, and to consider 
their individual impacts or how they might work better. 
 
There are, however, dangers with this approach. The national, European and international 
economic and in particular science, technology and innovation environment has greatly 
altered. There is a danger that policy thinking in member-states and regions might not be 
sufficiently responsive to such changes and more geared towards its own influence and 
survival than to the adjustments and adaptations needed. Furthermore the national imitation 
and copying strategies followed over the years have led to a continuous adding of national, 
regional and European policy measures and initiatives so that it is sometimes difficult today to 
see the systemic logic of most national policies. It is hence not surprising that as illustrated in 
Chapter 3, we find in many member countries broadly similar policies, at least by name, 
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which sometimes appear in one member country case an ideal example of a “best practice” 
and in another member country case nearly as perfect an example of “worst practice”. 
Furthermore, there is, apart from the lack of systemic transparency of RTD policies 
increasingly also a certain degree of administrative policy overlap, with currently only a set of 
negative funding structure rules – the matching and competition rules imposed by EU 
legislation. It seems time to come back to some of the subsidiarity principles in giving priority 
to the design and implementation of RTD policies to regional, national and European policy 
makers. The specific case of Belgium (reviewed in the Appendix) might actually be helpful 
here: the more local technology and innovation policies are designed and carried out by the 
regions, they are likely to benefit greatly from careful benchmarking exercises; the (higher) 
education policy initiatives are the responsibilities of the language communities; fiscal and 
some other specific policies the responsibility of the national government. Effectively such a 
distribution of policies has already taken form with many policy areas having shifted to EU 
level such as intellectual property, the European patent. However, it would be useful to design 
a more optimal subsidiarity structure of RTD policies.  
 
In conclusion it can be argued that regional, national and European RTD policies seem ready 
for a major shake-up, following some simple basic principles. 
 
The systemic framework suggested in the present Report provides in the view of the 
Experts Group a set of relatively simple basic guiding principles. First, policies aimed 
at reinforcing particular constituents should be targeted at the weak parts of each 
constituent; policies aimed at bridging should focus on the weak linkages or some of 
the unwarranted trade-offs implicit in reinforcing policies and actions of the past. 
Second, given the oversupply of individual policy schemes, often run on an isolated 
and independent basis and inherited from the past, we suggest that any new scheme 
introduced in the RTD policy area must be accompanied by the winding down of at 
least two existing schemes. Third, the systemic approach suggested here implies that 
with respect to R&D programme evaluation, there should be less emphasis on 
separate programme-by-programme evaluations, and more on processes and on firm 
and sector-focused impacts. 
 
4.5  Benchmarking lessons: On the generic nature, transferability and robustness of best-
practices 
 
The conceptual analysis presented in Chapter 1 suggests that the assumption that there is one 
single best-practice RTD-policy in a specific field when it comes to stimulate employment 
and strengthen competitiveness appears difficult to be maintained. The benchmarking exercise 
of RTD-policies should therefore introduce a number of new concepts which we suggest 
would qualify as a best practice: 
 
- First, how generic is the practice. Is it independent of the institutional, sectoral and 
geographical context or is it part of an integrated system? This corresponds in 
technical jargon to stand alone versus systemic components and relates to the limits of 
modularisation. 
- Second, how transferable is the practice. A practice that works well in many different 
contexts may still be difficult to transplant from one context to another. Hearts work in 
all people but they might be hard to transplant from one human body to another. 
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- Third, how robust is it. Can it be expected to remain a best practice over time also 
when new modes of production and innovation enter the scene. 
 
From the similarities in the list of national policies in Table 3.1 it appears clear that many 
actual policy practices that seem to work well in specific contexts (they are reasonably 
generic), have been successfully transplanted, imitated and copied and seem to have become 
reasonably robust – they have worked well for a longer period. But there are also policy 
instruments that have proved to be non-generic, non-transferable and non-robust. 
 
As the analysis in Chapter 3 (section 3.3) illustrated generic, robust and transferable practices 
prove to be procedural and institutional rather than very specific forms of government 
intervention. Different institutional solutions could be found in different countries. The case 
studies discussed in Chapter 3 as well as the country studies carried out and summarized in 
Appendix B highlighted the diversity of RTD policies in use, their different biases and 
possible weaknesses. They did not, however, tell us much about the generic, robust or 
transferable nature of such national or regional policies. 
 
From this perspective a pre-requiste for “intelligent” benchmarking is, in the Experts 
Group view that governments (national or local) have established: 
- institutions/mechanisms that help to sort out what are generic and robust trends 
rather than policy fads and fashion.  
- institutions/mechanisms that help to define the specialisation and institutional set 






4.6 Data and methodological issues.  
 
Intelligent benchmarking as described above requires of course data on a wide number of 
issues. The data which were made available within the context of this study allowed us to 
conduct only a rough empirical analysis. It will be clear that the quality of the analysis in this 
area depends crucially on the availability of appropriate data. That data covers both 
performance as well as policy indicators. As governments take a more active part in building 
up the appropriate amount of knowledge in their economies, e.g. through the provision of tax 
incentives, direct aid to research, but most of all through adjusting the institutional framework 
within which firms operate: the rules of competition, the educational system, the protection of 
intellectual property rights and regulations, indicators on such variables are badly needed.  
 
Furthermore, an understanding of innovative capacity, and in particular of national 
differences in innovative capacity and the capacity to undertake successful cross-national  
innovations requires a much more rigorous and discrete modeling approach.  New theoretical 
advances in supermodularity and econometric testing for it actually allow for more in depth 
study of the existence and role of complementarities between discrete structures. The 
benchmarking of RTD policies offers from this perspective an ideal framework for such 
analyses. As the theoretical and empirical analyses carried out in Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate a 
systemic vision with respect to the (inter-)national innovation process requires also a more 
comprehensive methodological framework when addressing the efficacy of RTD policies. To 
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what extent are incentives to innovation are interrelated? Can one be changed in isolation 
without changing the others? Or are they interdependent, each being a building block in a 
system?  If so, an innovation policy should build around a system of mutually compatible and 
reinforcing incentives. From this perspective benchmarking has so far been strong on policy 
rethoric but poor on methodology.   
 
We recommend an in depth research programme on the methodology of benchmarking 
including the collection of the appropriate data needed for such regular activities. 
There are as we have argued in this Report both methodological as well as empirical 
questions which can be raised with respect to the current wave of politically inspired 
benchmarking exercises. The success of the open method of coordination depends by 
and large on the soundness of the underlying methodological framework used in 
benchmarking and the active search for improved and more appropriate measures and 
indicators in the various relevant areas.  
 
4.7 RTD policies in services and the "weightless economy" 
 
We discussed in this Report only briefly the role of intangibles and of RTD and innovation in 
the service sectors as new methodological and conceptual challenges for both RTD policy, 
competitiveness and employment. The limited attention to these issues, highlights actually the 
continuous overriding importance given in most countries and regions as well as the EU, to 
industrial RTD and innovation. Such importance is increasingly unjustified as services and 
other non- industrial activities play a growing role in international competitiveness and have 
for decennia now been the dominant sector of employment in most EU countries. We briefly 
discussed in Chapter 1 the underlying reasons for such a neglect. One main reason, which we 
would like to bring to the forefront here, is the need for reliable information in this area. Just 
as industrial R&D data are very much something developed in the 60’s, culminating in the 
Frascati manual, and innovation data something developed in the 80’s, culminating in the 
Oslo manual, it is now time to develop data on RTD and innovation activities in services.   
 
As is well-known, despite major efforts, especially over the last decade, there is still 
considerable weakness in the data resources with which one can address aspects of the 
weightless economy.  Though it has often been said before, and though the situation is slowly 
improving, documentation concerning services industries still remains well behind that for 
manufacturing.  While we do now have data for (only some) services in the Community 
Innovation Surveys, there is reason for thinking that these survey instruments are inadequate 
to deal with the particular features of services innovation (see, for example, Tether, 2002).  As 
with so many RTD and innovation indicators they have been forged with manufacturing 
sector practices in mind – arguably, with a subset of these practices, to boot.  Though one may 
sympathise with statisticians’ desire to maintain data comparability over time, there is need to 
take such criticisms far more seriously than has so far been the case. 
 
The same holds for the measurement of intangibles. One rapidly growing concern relates to 
the need for international standardisation in reporting of companies. From an international 
accounting perspective, this is an important issue further exacerbated by the growing concerns 
about possible mal conversations that have so dramatically shaken the US and international 
business world. There is now an urgent need to go beyond institutional “battles” such as the 
one between the US GAAP and the IASC regulations. To some extent the international 
business community will choose itself the dominant accounting standard. Daimler Chrysler, 
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for instance, though largely a European Group, chose to adopt US GAAP norms instead of the 
IASC ones, primarily because of its need to get easy access to US financial markets and the 
NY Stock Exchange in particular. Others are likely to follow. This is one of the very 
‘tangible’ effects of globalisation on corporate behaviour with respect to intangibles. 
Reporting in corporate accounts of intangibles remains, however, a complex and difficult 
matter, which has been further questioned by the dramatic collapse of Enron and its 
reverberations in the scrutinising of Xerox and many other firms, and the more recent 
Worldcom case.  
 
Many questions remain hence open with respect to the formal reporting of intangibles. We 
know the importance of information as signalling for economic agents. From this perspective, 
the role of information on intangibles as a public good is obviously significant. The question 
can hence be raised whether public authorities, especially at the European level, should 
provide a specific effort dedicated to collecting and diffusing information on intangibles? 
Should the ongoing efforts by Eurostat be consolidated and in which form?  What should be 
the status of information on intangibles? If more standardised information has a more public 
good ‘status’, then there are probably initiatives to be taken at this level. We only touched 
briefly upon these and other issues with respect to reporting in this report, but it is clear that 
the debate on these issues are also likely to dominate the RTD measurement agenda of the 
coming years.  
 
We recommend a major statistical and policy initiative on the standardization of the 
measurement of RTD and innovation activities in services. That initiative should also 
include the many methodological, empirical, international standardisation issues 




This report has delivered a number of key messages on the relationships between Research, 
Technology, Development and Innovation, on the one hand, and socio-economic 
development, on the other. In a nutshell, these arguments are as follows: 
 
• There is a need for a systemic approach to understand the relationships between STI 
and socio-economic development: there is no simple one-way relationship between a 
“knowledge producing” sector and a “knowledge absorbing” sector; 
 
• Besides nodes in the innovation systems, flows  are of paramount importance, since 
diffusion of knowledge and the spillovers processes, combined with excellent 
absorptive and learning capacities of agents in the system, are key towards the 
creation of performing innovation systems; 
 
• In accordance, identification of the weakest links in systems is of primary importance, 
because these could hamper the functioning of the system as a whole. The role of 
intermediaries is also enlightened, as bridge-makers or facilitators between elements 
of the system; 
 
• Evolutionary approaches mean that situations are always context specific, path-
dependent and that changes are in their majority of an incremental nature, although 
“snake” behaviour exists and reflects moments of more radical innovation; 
 
• Human and social capital are the necessary oil in the system. 
 
These changes should ideally also be reflected in RTD policies. If we compare the recent 
evolutions in Science, Technology and Innovation policies with the main arguments put 
above, we see indeed a number of convergence areas (OECD, 2000)4. Those evolutions can 
be characterized by the following main trends: 
 
1. Policies put an increasing focus on the stimulation of the knowledge flows in the 
systems , through support to networking and collaboration in research, technology 
and innovation, both within the research and within the industry sectors, and across the 
two. Examples of the former types of policies are support to research consortia and 
creation of centres of excellence, creating critical masses of research activities in specific 
areas. Networking within business for innovation is encouraged through cluster policies, 
while joint business R&D activities also are subject of policy support, not the least from 
the European level. Finally, the promotion of industry-science relationships is a long 
standing focus of STI policies, and many programmes are designed with such an objective 
in mind: creation of intermediaries, of bridging and collaborative programmes, etc. We 
suggest that such policies have their highest efficacy and contribution to global 
competitiveness and sustainable employment when implemented at the regional level. 
 
2. Incentive policies for business. Supporting the creation of new-technology-based firms  
is a more recent, but much developed area for policy intervention: various types of 
subsidies, soft schemes, transfer programmes, venture capital funds, academic 
entrepreneurship promotion programmes, changes in IPR rules, etc. are set up with public 
                                                 
4 OECD (2000), Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2000, Paris. 
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intervention, in order to create a better environment for new firm creation, notably for 
those founded on the exploitation of research results. 
 
3. It is recognised that human capital is the key in a knowledge –driven economy : 
reducing skills mismatches and enhancing labour mobility, both between science and 
industry and internationally, receive a lot of policy attention in the majority of EU 
countries. 
 
4. Reinforcing the science base, through a renewed commitment to fund scientific research, 
goes along with reforms of the science base, incorporating the following moves: more 
autonomy of research organizations but also more accountability, more competition in 
funds allocation, and also growing demand for linkages with users of research results. 
 
5. Tackling the specific deficiencies experienced by SMEs in their innovation trajectories 
is a frequent point of attention of policies: because of their limited size, these companies 
often lack the critical mass to support all the necessary functions needed to innovate. 
Many “SME-specific” programmes aim at addressing these barriers, and favourable 
access conditions are designed for companies under a certain size in more general support 
programmes. 
 
There are also changes in the modes of implementation of policies. Here, the recent years 
have witnessed the following new orientations : 
 
6. Policy frameworks are being enhanced, through a more reflexive process for policy 
design, more widespread evaluation practices, and an increased attention to policy 
outcomes and impacts. Here the use of “intelligent benchmarking” practices, involving 
context-related policy comparisons rather than the copy of best practices, can play a vital 
role to nurture the above new developments; 
 
7. Society participation in policy design is favoured through consultative and prospective 
exercises, establishment or reinforcement of advisory bodies, etc. Generally speaking, STI 
is put higher on the policy agendas, as it is more and more recognised as a legitimate area 
for policy intervention, in the view of enhancing competitiveness of the economies, albeit 
in a longer-term perspective. 
 
The above picture presents a maybe somewhat optimistic view on recent policy 
developments: each trend is not active to a similar extent for all countries, far from it. But it 
can be seen that, overall, the accent on the linkages in the system is well present in policy 
action. The accent on SMEs and NTBFs creation, as well as on ISR, reflect the idea that the 
weakest links in the system should be enhanced in priority, although it is not always ensured 
that the observed policy priorities are defined according to the results of thorough analyses of 
the innovation systems. The argument that the policies should be context-dependent is well in 
line with a relatively new accent on the improvement of policy design processes (evaluation, 
use of empirical evidence for policy building, more inclusive modes of policy making, etc.). 
The reinforcement of the science base is also in line with the importance recognised to the 
creation of new knowledge in the system, provided of course that this is accompanied with 
other moves towards the creation of linkages between this science base and the rest of the 
system. The necessary accent on human resources is perhaps the major area where policy 
developments need more attention in the future. 
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Thus, it can be said that a new “theoretical” agenda for policy making in the RTD area is 
already identified, but that it will only be put in practice fruitfully if “policy intelligence” 
capabilities are enhanced, so that the elements of the RTD policy portfolio (and the shape of 
this portfolio as a whole) are fine-tuned to the reality of the innovation system in which they 
operate. In short, in policy making too, knowledge will not be used despite all efforts to  
"distribute" knowledge such as this report of a group of experts if there is no matching 
learning capacity. 
 
  
